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Politics of Religious Freedom: Case Studies  
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INTRODUCTION 
The right to religious liberty has gained particular prominence in 
international law and human rights discourse over the last two 
decades. While religious liberty was a foundational principle of the 
post-1948 U.N. Charter political order, international treaties, and 
national constitutions, in the 1990s the need to protect and promote 
religious freedom took on a new importance and urgency.  
Freedom of religion and belief was formally recognized in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),1 the 
European and American human rights conventions of 1950 and 1978 
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 2, 18, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).  
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respectively,2 the two human rights Covenants of 1976,3 the 1981 
U.N. General Assembly Declaration on religious intolerance and 
discrimination,4 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights of 1986.5 In 1986, the United Nations appointed its first 
Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and adopted a second 
declaration on religious intolerance in 1993.6  
Despite these guarantees provided by human rights conventions 
and provisions, religious liberty has emerged as a highly contentious 
and charged issue in the international human rights community. 
There are multiple reasons for this, including the increased salience 
of religious identity in the world, and the intellectual and political 
resistance posed to secularist assumptions about human flourishing 
by a variety of social movements. While the larger consequences of 
such developments are unknown, what is clear is that religious liberty 
has become a key site of legal and political struggles to negotiate 
communal relations across lines of religious difference. 
In Europe, despite the fact that the right to religious freedom has 
been part of the European human rights system since 1950, the 
European Court of Human Rights handed down its first major 
decision concerning religious freedom only in 1993 in a case 
involving proselytism directed towards an Eastern Orthodox 
Christian in Greece.7 While there were no doubt cases of religious 
discrimination in the past that might have been challenged locally, 
what is distinct about the 1990s is that increasingly struggles between 
minority and majority religious communities are staged as 
contestations over the right to religious liberty. As a result, since 
 
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention on 
Human Rights art. 12, July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.  
3.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2, 18, 27, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.  
4. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief arts. 1, 6, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. 
A/36/684 (Nov. 25, 1981). 
5.  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, arts. 17, 18(2), 20(3), June 
27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981). 
6. Commission on Human Rights resolution 1986/20 of 10 March 1986; 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, 
A/RES/48/128, 20 December 1993. 
7. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1993). 
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2001 far more cases have been brought before the Court involving 
claims by religious communities (both majorities and minorities), key 
among them claims to freedom of religion and belief by European 
Muslims.8  
In the United States, the U.S. Congress passed the International 
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) in 1998 during the second term of the 
Clinton Administration.9 The Act both expressly invoked religious 
freedom as a human right recognized in U.S. and international law 
alike and established a Commission on International Religious 
Freedom to monitor, promote, and protect that right worldwide.10 The 
implementation of IRFA has had mixed results and has changed over 
time. IRFA has been criticized for the disproportionate role American 
evangelical Christians played in its passage, for its preoccupation 
with the plight of Christians rather than that of other religious 
minorities, and the systemic inequality produced by majoritarian 
religious politics.11 Others have criticized IRFA for being a foreign 
policy instrument in the service of U.S. strategic interests.12 The 
American foreign policy establishment itself has begun to appreciate 
the complexity of the world religious landscape in which IRFA seeks 
to intervene. In other words, since its passage, IRFA has been subject 
to a variety of transformations and critiques from within and without.  
Public debate over religious freedom has also intensified over 
the last two decades in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. In 
these regions, the ascendance of contentious politics that are often 
described as religious has heightened sectarian tensions, and religious 
minorities have turned to religious freedom clauses in their national 
constitutions and international human rights instruments to seek 
protection from social and state-endorsed discrimination. In India, for 
example, the wide-scale mobilization and subsequent ascension of 
right-wing Hindu extremist parties to political power has unleashed 
attacks on those designated as religious minorities under the 
 
8.  See Peter Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663 (2011). 
9. International Religious Freedom Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (1998). 
10.  IRFA specifically refers to the UDHR, the ICCPR, the Helsinki Accords, 
the 1981 Declaration, the U.N. Charter, and the ECHR: sec. 2(a)(2)-(3). In 
particular, the Act draws on Art. 18 of the UDHR and Art. 18 of the ICCPR which 
the U.S. ratified with reservations in April 1992. 
11.  See, e.g., Melani McAlister, US Evangelicals and the Politics of Slave 
Redemption as Religious Freedom in Sudan, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 87 (2014). 
12. See, e.g., Peter Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International 
Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 35 (2002). 
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Tolerance model,13 particularly against Muslims and Christians. In 
response, not only the religious minorities but their supporters (both 
religious and secular) have mobilized religious freedom discourse as 
a shield from sectarian violence.  
In Iraq, Nigeria, and Iran, the persecution of non-Muslim and 
Muslim minorities has increasingly come to be seen as a clarion call 
for institutionalizing international protocols for protecting the 
religious rights of minorities. In Egypt, Coptic Christians, who 
comprise the largest resident Christian population of the Arab world, 
have been systematically discriminated against by the Egyptian state. 
Recent political changes in the country, the overthrow of the 
Mubarak regime and subsequent rise of the military rule, have not 
improved their condition but have made Copts more vulnerable to 
various forms of discrimination and violence. As a result of this 
discrimination, Coptic Christians have increasingly turned to IRFA to 
put pressure on the Egyptian government to change the 
discriminatory laws of the country and bring their plight to the world 
stage. They have also made important alliances with American 
evangelical networks to mobilize U.S. churches to advocate on their 
behalf.14  
Elsewhere in Africa, we see a different kind of politics emerging 
around religious freedom. In South Africa, for example, the post-
apartheid constitutional order explicitly incorporates the full array of 
international human rights norms regarding self-determination, 
minority rights, freedom of religion, and substantive equality. This 
has generated new and intense debates on questions of legal pluralism 
and the tensions between individual and group rights and identities. 
For the first time, intensive law reform efforts are underway to 
recognize the claims of and redress past discrimination against 
different religious communities, including tribal groups living under 
customary law and religious minorities with their own family and 
personal status laws. While South Africa is a liberal democratic state, 
it is striking how the norms and assumptions underpinning this debate 
differ markedly from engagements involving the claims of religious 
communities in Europe and North America today. 
 
13. See CASSIE S. ADCOCK, THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE: INDIAN SECULARISM 
AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2014). 
14. See Saba Mahmood, Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and 
Geopolitics in the Middle East, 15 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 418 (2012). 
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In all these places, and in many others in the world today, 
multiple narratives of religious freedom are being mobilized. 
Numerous versions are being created that often sit at odds with 
dominant European, American, and even U.N. protocols that exist on 
the issue. It is important to ask what is taking place under the rubric 
of religious freedom that overlaps with, but is also distinct from, 
authoritative discourses circulated in Europe, the United States, and 
the United Nations.  
It is these and related questions that led us to initiate a four-year, 
multidisciplinary research project funded by the Henry Luce 
Foundation in New York to study how religious freedom is being 
transformed through legal and political contestations in the United 
States, the Middle East, South Asia, and the European Union.15 The 
project has been both global and historical in scope and its object has 
been to generate a body of research and writing on the global history 
and politics of religious freedom that can serve scholars, teachers and 
researchers, contemporary policy debates, international human rights 
circles, and local civil society organizations involved in this issue. 
Premised upon the assumption that religious freedom exists in the 
plural and not the singular, it has undertaken a collaborative 
international study of the concept and practice of religious freedom as 
it has taken shape in different contexts, past and present, and in 
different countries.  
In the course of the project, two critical trajectories in particular 
have emerged: one which reexamines early modern European and 
post-Enlightenment histories and anthropologies of the right to 
religious liberty and seeks to make visible both their provincial 
character and contingent relationship to rival religious and political 
projects;16 and another which analyzes the development of the 
concepts of religion and religious liberty in non-European histories 
and contexts during the colonial and post-colonial periods in order to 
re-think the normative and prescriptive accounts of religious liberty 
often found in international law and human rights debates.17 
 
15. POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CONTESTED NORMS AND LOCAL 
PRACTICES, http://politics-of-religious-freedom.berkeley.edu/ (last visited June 28, 
2014).  
16. See, e.g., Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the 
European Court of Human Rights, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 9 (2014); Ian Hunter, 
Religious Freedom in Early Modern Germany: Theology, Philosophy, and Legal 
Casuistry, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 37 (2014).  
 17. See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, A Leap of Faith: The Construction of Hindu 
Majoritarianism through Secular Law, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 109 (2014); Saba 
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An important component of the project has been to publish 
translations of and commentaries on key legal (not simply judicial but 
also legislative) cases from around the world involving claims to and 
contestation regarding religious freedom. This Special Issue of the 
Maryland Journal of International Law is the first result of these 
efforts and it includes case studies from the United Kingdom (the 
Jews’ Free School case), India (the Ayodhya case), Malaysia (the 
Lina Joy and Shamala v. Jayaganesh cases) and South Africa (the 
Recognition of Muslim Marriages Bill). We hope to publish further 
case studies and commentaries, especially in relation to recent 
judicial decisions in Egypt, in forthcoming volumes of the journal.  
The primary motivation in publishing these case studies is to 
make available English-language analysis of legal cases from various 
parts of the world that invoke a claim to religious freedom. The 
reasons for this lacuna are various, key among them access to 
regional languages and networks. In many instances, legal cases also 
involve public education or civil society campaigns that have 
changed public perceptions of key issues (such as minority religious 
rights). Our aim therefore has been not only to make the legal 
judgments available, but to provide a narrative context for each case.  
In particular, our hope is that these case studies will be of 
interest to teachers and scholars across the disciplines—religious 
studies, anthropology, critical theory, sociology, international 
relations, law schools—and to legal practitioners in various parts of 
the world. We have found that the majority of case books on the topic 
of religious freedom, especially those used in law schools, focus on 
the legal arguments and judgments in the cases and are concerned 
mainly with Euro-Atlantic jurisprudence. By contrast, our objective 
has been to focus on critical discourses, materials, and interviews 
with prominent activists and lawyers from parts of the world that are 
usually excluded or absent in the extant literature. 
While the Politics of Religious Freedom project has benefitted 
from the insights offered by these different studies and approaches to 
religious liberty, it has also been distinct in that it asks whether 
 
Mahmood and Peter Danchin, Immunity or Regulation? Antinomies of Religious 
Freedom, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 129 (2014). See also Symposium: Re-Thinking 
Religious Freedom, 29 J. L. & RELIGION 358 (2014) (A special issue, co-edited by 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd); POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood & 
Peter Danchin eds., forthcoming 2015). 
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religious liberty can indeed be treated as a singular or stable principle 
aimed at achieving shared goals and objectives given the diversity of 
historical and political contexts. American and UN discourses on 
religious freedom tend to conceive of freedom of conscience in 
individualist terms, often assuming, in addition, that the presence, or 
not, of religious liberty can be objectively assessed. This tendency 
further reinforces the sense that there exists a global yardstick of sorts 
for measuring religious liberty, and categorizes state practice as free, 
un-free, or somewhere in between.18  An impartial observer can, it is 
implied, pick up this measuring stick and readily discern what 
religious freedom is and what it is not.  
As our own experience and work in this project confirms, 
religious freedom cannot be so easily defined or readily measured. It 
is not possible to define religious freedom in the singular. In an era of 
increasing pluralization and globalization, and a time of great conflict 
and misunderstanding involving religion and religious difference, it is 
not clear that the various enforcers, political and judicial, of 
international laws protecting religious freedom have the tools 
available at their disposal to make their jobs conceivable and 
possible.  
Accordingly, the case studies in this Special Issue explore 
different understandings of religious freedom in an attempt to de-
center conceptualizations that have dominated the discussion in the 
U.S. and international policy circles. The authors each discern and 
engage with a broader and more diverse field of practices than 
conventionally designated and defended as “religious freedom” in 
mainstream debates. By making these narratives available, the case 
studies each thus provide new templates for thinking about the 
question of religious freedom and its relation to the politics of human 
rights and the politics of religious difference. 
While it is apparent that the last two decades have witnessed an 
ascendance of claims for and against religious liberty, the case 
studies reveal that it is far from clear what exactly governments, 
human rights activists, religious groups, and religious minorities 
actually mean when they claim protection of religious rights. All this 
 
18. Under IRFA, for example, the Commission on International Religious 
Freedom is required to submit an annual report to the President, the Secretary of 
State, and Congress setting out its findings with respect to the presence or not of 
religious freedom in every country in the world with the exception of the United 
States and policy recommendations for the U.S. government with respect to various 
categories of violation of international religious freedom: sec. 203. 
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is further compounded by the fact that unlike binding international 
treaties that exist on a range of issues (such as genocide, torture, 
racial discrimination, children’s and women’s rights, etc.), no such 
treaty exists on the issue of religious freedom. The most 
comprehensive statement remains the 1981 Declaration of the UN 
General Assembly on religious intolerance and discrimination, but 
this is non-binding on states under international law. It is further 
challenged by competing declarations, such as the 1990 Cairo 
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam,19 which implicitly criticize the 
UDHR and subsequent instruments for failing to take into account the 
variety of cultural and religious contexts. Thus, perhaps more than in 
other areas of human rights, there is broad disagreement over norms 
pertaining to the right to religious liberty and how competing 
conceptions of this right (as an individual or group right, for example, 
or regarding the sources or philosophical foundations of the right) are 
to be settled. What we can see instead is that most such conflicts tend 
to be settled either by judicial casuistry and federal regulation (legal 
formalism) or through political disputes and settlements. 
Importantly, these case studies explore the variety of norms and 
claims made in the name of religious liberty not so much to reveal an 
unstable essence or document its various valences and meanings, but 
rather to map out the nodal points around which disagreements over 
religious freedom tend to occur in a variety of national and political 
contexts. This is critical because in order to reach any sort of 
agreement in the human rights and international communities, it is 
important first to understand analytically what the conceptual and 
practical stakes are in the battle over religious freedom. It is further 
important to ask whether religious freedom, given its manifold 
deployments and limitations, is the best way to achieve co-existence 
across manifold differences for the variety of actors involved.  
Rather than reduce such differences to a lowest common 
denominator, the case studies map out the nature of these differences 
and consider what their implications would be at the policy level, 
both at national and international levels. They thus implicitly raise 
the question whether, if indeed religious freedom is not one thing, the 
variety of forms it takes is commensurable with a global project that 
seeks to implement shared protocols and norms for its adjudication? 
What sorts of institutional and practical structures would such 
 
19. Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 24, 25, U.N. GAOR, 4th 
Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (Aug. 5, 1990). 
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implementation require? For whom, under what conditions, and 
under which terms? 
Viewed together, the case studies reveal that disagreements 
about what religious freedom might mean often unfold around certain 
themes. These themes, while specific to certain historical and 
political contexts, also cut across this specificity and reveal the 
structural tensions that haunt the debate around religious freedom. 
Some of the key themes around which such conflicts occur include: 
religious freedom conceived as an individual versus a collective 
right; the proper “source(s)” or philosophical basis of religious 
freedom as a human right; the place of minorities in a democracy and 
the protections accorded to them; the proper boundary between 
religion and state; the relation of religious freedom to global politics; 
and what religion is imagined to be in struggles over religious 
liberty.20 
The tension between individualist and collective conceptions of 
rights is especially acute in the case of religious freedom. The tension 
emerges along two dimensions: first, regarding the subject of the 
right; and second, regarding the nature and scope of the claim itself. 
Does the claim, for example, include notions of the collective good or 
collective identity? In much Anglo-American law and philosophy, it 
has often been assumed (without much debate) that the individual is 
the proper subject of rights, and that the claim to religious liberty is a 
claim to freedom of conscience and to free exercise of religion—
subject only to general limitations by the state. While champions of 
this position often ground it in the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, others argue that such a conception is difficult to uphold 
in practice or in theory not only in other parts of the world (including 
in many modern liberal democracies) but also in American history. 
Indeed, this is not how religious freedom is codified in international 
law which includes explicit provisions on national self-determination, 
the rights of national, ethnic and religious minorities, and the rights 
of indigenous peoples.  
Ratna Kapur’s case study on the Ayodhya case, for example, 
shows that in India religious freedom consists in the state granting 
various religious groups juridical autonomy over family affairs in the 
 
20. These themes were the subject of a multidisciplinary course on Religious 
Freedom and the Rights of Religious Minorities taught by the project team at the 
European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratization in 
Venice in July 2011. See http://politics-of-religious-freedom.berkeley.edu/course/ 
(last visited June 28, 2014).  
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form of family or personal status laws. Thus various religious groups, 
including Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, and 
Parsees, are legally recognized as both the addressees and bearers of 
claims of right. These claims are recognized as extending to 
individual and collective aspects of freedom of religion and to the 
protection of separate (majority and minority) religious and cultural 
identities. Such a conception of religious freedom is not without 
paradoxes, as exemplified in politically charged battles over the 
status of family law: feminist critics often assert that these laws 
privilege group rights over the rights of women as individuals. Others 
argue that instituting a uniform civil code for adjudicating family 
affairs would compromise the autonomy accorded to religious 
minorities. Such contestations illustrate the contested and polyvalent 
nature of claims to religious freedom in situations where the 
collective aspects of the right are legalized. 
The case study by Waheeda Amien and Annie Leatt 
(Dhammameghā) on the recognition of Muslim marriages in post-
apartheid South Africa reveals another important dimension of the 
global complexity of religious liberty. As discussed above, since 
1996 South Africa has embarked on an ambitious program to institute 
the right to religious freedom that combines both individualist and 
collective conceptions. Given the diversity of South Africa, this is a 
challenging project, one that puts to test the easy assumption often 
made in the scholarship on religious freedom that group rights are 
necessarily antithetical to conceptions of justice and democracy.  
South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution explicitly recognizes 
the collective aspects of the right to religious freedom, making it a 
key element in the transformation of politics between religious 
communities, and opening new spaces for legal and social reform and 
contestation. The 1996 Bill of Rights guarantees cultural and 
religious communities the right to enjoy their culture and practice 
their religion, and effectively makes both religious-based law and 
secular law available for the adjudication of family affairs. As in 
many other countries, South Africa has instituted an ambitious 
curriculum of primary and secondary religious education to inform 
and prepare citizens for this complex project. These curricula 
themselves form a part of the global project of religious liberty and 
deserve to be studied in more detail.  
In Europe, the question of the place and protection of religious 
minorities in European nation-states reveals both similar and different 
2014]   POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 303 
dynamics. While the European Convention on Human Rights 
expressly protects the right to freedom of religion and belief, it 
contains no provisions on minority or group rights (despite a long 
pre-World War II history of granting group rights). Claims of Muslim 
and other minority religious communities (such as Roma) involving 
issues of collective autonomy and identity are thus unsettling existing 
normative legal categories, and have catalyzed new forms of politics 
and rethinking of both the historical and theoretical premises of 
modern liberal political order in Europe.  
At a deeper level, the European Court of Human Rights’ post-
2001 religious freedom jurisprudence has raised anew the question of 
the relationship between religion and public order. In its reasoning, 
the European Court has constructed competing normative accounts of 
notions such as “secularism,” “neutrality,” “equality,” and the “right” 
either to accept or deny claims to religious liberty while at the same 
time granting the state a wide “margin of appreciation” to 
accommodate majoritarian religious sensibilities in the name of 
public order. In a nation-state system where Christianity has been the 
dominant religious tradition and where state and state law continue to 
reflect this heritage and ongoing relationship, various contradictions 
and tensions with modern accounts of state neutrality and liberal 
rights have surfaced.  
In these cases, a complex historical and normative relationship 
between Christianity and secularism can be seen to continue to define 
the modern contours and shape of the public sphere and the right to 
religious liberty itself. Assertions of claims of right by Muslims and 
other religious communities have thus made visible both the 
historical contingency and cultural particularity of these norms and 
forms of legal ordering in Europe. The case study by Heather Miller 
Rubens and accompanying article by Peter Danchin and Louis Blond 
vividly illustrate how these tensions and antinomies both animate and 
underpin the judgments of the U.K. Supreme Court in the Jews’ Free 
School case.  
In similar terms, but moving beyond Europe to struggles over 
religious freedom in Malaysia, Tamir Moustafa’s case study on the 
Lina Joy and Shamala v. Jayaganesh cases illustrates the complex 
and often surprising ways that majority and minority groups both 
assert claims to religious freedom and how particular legal and 
normative arrangements internal to liberal rights discourse often 
exacerbate rather than resolve the frequency and intensity of these 
legal dilemmas.  
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In conclusion, religious freedom, not unlike other fundamental 
freedoms invented in the last century, is a contested and multivalent 
historical construct that has taken on new lives of its own in the 
world. These case studies investigate these lives and raise a host of 
questions for future thought and inquiry: What models of religious 
freedom can be identified in a world of plural landscapes of religious 
co-existence? Who mobilizes them, and toward what ends? How are 
local practices of religious co-existence being transformed by the 
introduction of Western discourses on religious freedom? What 
differences and incommensurabilities may be identified between 
state-centered notions of religious freedom and forms of religious co-
existence practiced by communities? What kinds of religious subjects 
are presumed and created by the various formulations of religious 
freedom that have assumed hegemony in past decades? In what ways 
does religious freedom become intertwined with other regimes of 
power and knowledge, such as strategic interests, international legal 
debates, global and regional power politics, and neoliberal economic 
agendas,, and with what effects? And finally, what does international 
religious freedom signify in a context in which Euro-American 
understandings of religion have diversified far beyond the protestant 
forms around which they were originally articulated and 
institutionalized? Is it possible to imagine forms of religious (or non-
religious) freedom that do not become a mode of exercising power 
through the claim that (Christian or Protestant) secular practices of 
religious freedom are neutral and universal? 
For scholars, researchers, policy-makers, and students interested 
in understanding the contemporary law and politics of religious 
freedom, these case studies will stimulate such unfamiliar and, at 
times, uncomfortable lines of thought and inquiry.   
